This paper models a supply chain of a manufacturer, a retailer and two different consumer segments. One segment has a high willingness-to-pay and the other a low willingness-to-pay. The manufacturer decides on the wholesale price and the selling price is determined by the retailer. It is well known that a straightforward wholesale price contract does not coordinate the channel. But that the pull discount mechanism (that is: the manufacturer provides a discount directly to the end consumers) does coordinate the channel. In the above setting the pull discount mechanism coordinates for a greater range of parameter values compared to the wholesale price discount but not for the entire possible range. In this paper we show that two other types of contracts, namely the revenue sharing and the profit sharing mechanisms do coordinate the supply chain and, furthermore, provide win-win for the entire range of parameter values. Our analysis has also established an equivalence relationship between the revenue sharing and the profit sharing mechanism.
Introduction
Frequently a conflict within a channel of distribution is by the tussle over the division of total profits which inadvertently leads to a destruction of potential channel income. Both manufacturer and retailer's self-interested marketing decisions can damage profits of the other. This cause for channel inefficiency is known as double marginalization (see e.g. Spengler (1950) , Moorthy (1988) , Bolton and Bananno (1988) , Tirole (1989, pp. 174-175) , Lilien, Kotler, and Moorthy (1992, p.419 
)).
It is well known that the first step towards establishing coordination is to share information between the business entities of the supply chain. Sharing information is a necessary condition but need not be sufficient for achieving coordination and to improve overall supply chain performance. Hence, besides sharing information, organizations use two main approached to achieve coordination.
Vertical Integration (combined ownership), an extreme case is difficult to implement as it is not always preferable, practical or feasible. A relatively simpler approach is to modify the governance structure of the trading relationship, for example, by modifying the ownership (i.e., "who owns what") and/or modifying decision rights (i.e. "who decides what") or aligning the business processes to streamline the material and information flows in the chain. An example of this approach is Vendor Managed _____________________________________________________________________ Coordination with Supply Chain Contracts in the Presence of two different consumer segments Inventory (VMI), where inventory decision rights are transferred to vendor to remove inefficiencies.
The second approach which is relatively easier one is to modify the terms of trade to coordinate the decisions of the business entities within the chain. Modification of terms of trade is done through contracts over certain trade parameters (variables). This approach aims to achieve coordination between business entities by providing incentives to share risks and/or rewards. There are several contract mechanisms that can be designed & used to make sure that the independent decisions taken by business entities optimizes the overall performance of the whole chain (in such case, we say that the mechanism coordinate the chain). Buy-back contracts and profit sharing contracts are examples for the risk and reward sharing contract mechanisms. In a nutshell the contracts will enable all independent business entities to improve their performance, when compared to an uncoordinated situation, or at least must enable some of them to improve with others not being worse off. In such a case, we say that the contract mechanism leads to a win-win situation. This paper designs revenue sharing and the profit sharing mechanisms. This paper considers the setting of the Hess (1995, 1991) which considers two different segments of customers who has different willingness-to-pay. That paper designs a pull pricing mechanism for channel coordination. Within this mechanism manufacturer offers discounts directly to consumer. In the above setting we test the applicability of the revenue sharing mechanism in which the manufacturer receives a share of retailer's revenue in addition to the wholesale price. We also design the profit sharing mechanism where the manufacturer receives a share of retailers profit in addition to the wholesale price. Targeted pull-push discount in which the pull discount is accessible only to the price sensitive customers and a wholesale price discount is provided to the retailer is tested. Targeted pull discount mechanism in combination with the revenue and the profit sharing mechanism are designed and its performance is compared with the targeted push-pull discount.
In the next section the model and the numerical example that will be used to understand the relevance of the obtained results will be introduced. It also discusses the decentralized and centralized scenario analysis. In section 3 analyses the pull discount mechanism. We introduce the revenue sharing and the profit sharing mechanisms and show the effectiveness of each of these mechanisms in coordination and win-win. In the section 4 the targeted push-pull discounts and targeted pull discount in combination with the revenue and the profit sharing mechanism is designed. In section 5 we provide the final conclusions. As shown in the figure 1 a monopolist manufacturer distributes a single product through an exclusive independent retailer is considered. The retailer sets the price to maximize retail profit, and the manufacturer decides on the wholesale. Manufacturing and retailing costs are assumed for simplicity to be zero. Like in Hess (1995 & 1991) we follow the standard principle/agent tie-breaking assumption that when the retailer earns equal profits in two different alternatives, he chooses the alternative preferred by the manufacturer.
Model
Two consumer segments make up the market: high willingness-to-pay consumers (Highs for short) and low willingness-to-pay consumers (Lows for short). The product is sold to the retailer at a wholesale price W, and the retailer resells that product at a retail price P. The Highs place a reservation price, P H on the product, and the Lows have a reservation price P L , where . 0
It is convenient to normalize the size of the market to 1.0 (Q is normalized to 1). Let α be the segment size of Highs and 1-α be the segment size of Lows. For the rest of our analysis we assume that
In the above setting and when the condition
, holds a vertically integrated firm would have fixed the price in such a way that it would be able to sell its product to the entire market (i.e at P L ) . The profit for the channel when it sells to the entire market is P L . However, in a decentralized channel, the retailer always considers seeking a large margin by selling only to the highs at their reservation price, P H . The manufacturer's best response to a retailer who pursues large margins is to set the wholesale price equal to P H, driving the retailer's profit to zero. So the manufacturers channel profit is H P α which incidentally is the same for the entire channel. The double marginalization phenomena can be seen in this channel as long as
The double marginalization phenomena can be eliminated if the manufacturer sets his wholesale price such that it would encourage the retailer to fix the retail price at P L , thus making a sale to both the segments. Let W 1 be the wholesale price fixed by the manufacturer in this scenario. The retailers profit from selling only to highs at a price P H is ) (
The profit from selling to all customers at a price P L is . To obtain channel coordination, the manufacturer adjusts the wholesale price until the retailer is just indifferent between the two options. Setting the two retail profit expressions equal yields the following wholesale price:
The resulting profits of manufacturer and retailer when both Highs and Lows buy are The total channel's profit is P L . The independent manufacturer prefers to sell only to highs and to exclude the lows if profit is less than the profit from selling only to highs,
When the condition in equation 4 is satisfied then the manufacturer will not be interested in fixing the wholesale price, as in equation 1 as it gives him a loss in profit. However, from the previous analysis we know that the vertically integrated channel decides to sell to all the consumers at a price P L when
The range for the parameters within which the double marginalization makes its way can be obtained by combining equations 4 and 5 (double marginalization is the range within which the an independent manufacturer and retailer exclude lows from their sales plan, but a vertically integrated channel would not). It can be obtained as,
Gerstner and Hess (1995 & 1991) call the double marginalization range as the breakdown region. This breakdown also harms consumers. In an integrated channel, all consumers buy the product at a low price, P L . Highs obtain a positive surplus,
, whereas the Lows get zero surplus. The double marginalization breakdown implies that the product is purchased only by the highs at a high price, so all consumers get zero surpluses.
The above generalization can easily be followed from the following example. The willingness to pay for highs and lows is considered to be $3.00 and $2.00 respectively. Half the market consists of highs and half Lows. This independent channel is compared against a benchmark: a vertically integrated channel. A vertically integrated channel would set a price of $2.00 to maximize the profit that can be obtained from these two segments. Revenue is higher when both segments buy than when only highs buy (1.0 x $2.00 > 0.5x$3.00).
At exactly $1.00, the retailer will cooperate because identical $1.00 profits are earned by selling to the entire market at $2.00 or by selling only to the highs at $3.00. The manufacturer and retailer each secure a margin of $1.00 (from equations 2 & 3) and total channel profit is $2.00. The manufacturer would not be interested in coordination when P L < 2.25 (equation 4), where as the integrated channel would sell to both segments when P L > 1.5 (equation 5).
The manufacturer earns $1.50 with high margins and only $1.00 with low margins and so chooses high margins. However, the entire channel earns only $1.50 under the first alternative but $2.00 under the second. If the manufacturer and retailer join forces and commit to retail price of $2.00, the channel benefits. In addition, consumers are _____________________________________________________________________ Coordination with Supply Chain Contracts in the Presence of two different consumer segments also hurt by the breakdown because each High's surplus (willingness-to-pay less price) is reduced from $1.00 to zero.
Coordination mechanisms
This section introduces various coordination mechanisms namely the pull discount, revenue and profit sharing. The objective is to test if these mechanisms can coordinate the channel (maximum channel profit is obtained) and provide win-win (both the players make a greater profit than when they are operating independently). Supply chain (SC) contracts are coordination mechanisms that utilize incentives to make SC players' decisions coherent among each other. In particular, the incentives let the risk and the revenue (which arise from different sources of uncertainty and from channel coordination, respectively) be shared by all players.
Different models of SC contracts have been developed in the literature. They include the quantity flexibility contracts Tsay, (1999) , the backup agreements Eppen and Iyer, (1997) , the buy back or return policies (Pasternack, (1985) , Emmons and Gilbert, (1998) , Padmanabhan and Png, (1997) ), the incentive mechanisms Lee and Whang, (1999) , the revenue sharing contracts (Cachon and Lariviere, (2005) , Dana and Speir, (2001) ) and the Quantity discounts Weng, (1995) . Contract Mechanisms have also been studied extensively in the economics and marketing science literature where the issue of designing contractual agreements arises when a supplier uses intermediate firms to reach final consumers. Tirole, (1988) and Katz, (1989) provide excellent reviews of contracts in economics literature. Cachon (2003) has discussed the supply chain coordination with the contract mechanisms. In this paper we analyze the revenue and the profit sharing mechanisms in detail as they are able to provide coordination and win-win . In the next subsection we test the effectiveness of the pull promotion.
Pull promotion
A pull promotion mechanism refers to a situation in which the manufacturer offers discounts directly to the price-conscious consumers, expecting them to ask the retailer for the product. A manufacturer's pull discount would be most effective if offered only to those consumers (the Lows) who are least likely to buy the product otherwise. Such perfect targeting of the pull is unlikely, but Hess (1995,1991) assume that the discount is more easily obtained by the Lows than the Highs. That is, consumer's transaction costs of using the pull discount are higher for the Highs. This is true considering the fact the value of the time and effort spent in availing the pull discount will be high for the highs.
The use of discounts by consumers is modeled in a simple way. A consumer must exert effort to obtain the pull discount, and this effort has a monetary equivalent called the transaction cost. If the pull discount exceeds the transaction cost, the consumer uses the discount. For simplicity the lows transaction cost is normalized to zero, and the highs transaction cost is denoted by T. That is, T should be interpreted as the transaction cost differential between the Highs and the Lows.
Under the pure pull promotion Hess (1995, 1991) assume that the wholesale price is left at the level as in the decentralized scenario, i.e. W 2 = P H _____________________________________________________________________ Coordination with Supply Chain Contracts in the Presence of two different consumer segments (Where W 2 is the wholesale price with the pull discount mechanism). In Hess (1995, 1991) it is concluded that pull promotion reduces the range within which double marginalization is observed. The following analysis proves their result. The manufacturer offers consumers a pull discount, D 2 . The transaction cost the Highs incur to use the discount, T, is assumed to be less than 
To motivate channel coordination, the profit-maximizing manufacturer adjusts the pull discount until the retailer is just indifferent between cooperating or not. To calculate this discount, set the two retail profit expressions equal and solve for D 2 :
The profits for the manufacturer and retailer when cooperation is induced are
and the total channel profit equals P L .
The channel does not coordinate when both inequality (5) holds (that is, integrated channel would sell to all consumers) and when manufacturer profit in equation 8 is smaller than the profit from selling only to highs ( H P α ). Combining these two inequalities gives the breakdown region under pure pull,
Comparing equation 6 and equation 10 it is clear that pure pull shrinks the breakdown region: the right-hand side of the inequality is reduced by T α . From equation 10 we can obtain a bound for T which would make the pull discount feasible. From 10 it can be obtained that pull discount would coordinate the channel when the following condition on T is satisfied.
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As concluded above the pull discount mechanism is not able to eliminate the breakdown region completely and it also fails to provide any additional profit to the retailer as the wholesale price is fixed at P H . For the numerical example the pull discount mechanisms works when the transaction cost is greater than $0.5 (from equation 11). Next sub section analyses the performance of the revenue sharing contract in the above setting.
Revenue sharing mechanisms
In the revenue sharing mechanism the transactions between the supplier and buyer are governed by the supplier receiving a share of the buyer's revenues. The revenue sharing mechanism can be identified by two parameters, namely, wholesale price W and a percentage of the buyers profit γ (0<γ<1), that goes to the supplier. Many supply contracts in vertically-separated industries include revenue sharing. One recent example is from video-cassette rental industry, see (Cachon & Lariviere, (2005) , Dana & Spier, (2001) ). With the revenue sharing mechanisms the retailers profit when he sells only to the highs is
and the retailers profit when he sells to the entire market is:
The wholesale price should be set such that the retailer is indifferent between the above two options. That will happen when the manufacturer selects the wholesale price such that retailer's profit in equations 12 and equation 13 are equal:
The wholesale price is dependent on the percentage of the revenues shared and the wholesale price is a decreasing function of the percentage of revenues shared. The wholesale price is lower than that of the integrated channels (Equation 1) by a percentage of the revenue that the retailer shares with the manufacturer. The manufacturer would be interested in supplying the product at a wholesale price lower than that of the integrated channel as he will be receiving a share of retailer's revenue in addition to the wholesale price.
The profit for the manufacturer with the revenue sharing mechanism can be obtained as 
and the retailers profit is 
Proof: For ensuring win-win the profit for both the players must be greater than what they achieve in a solitaire scenario. The manufacturers profit must be greater than the profit he obtains in the solitaire scenario:
This gives a lower bound for γ, as
It is essential for the value of γ to be greater than 0, for which the value in equation 21 is made to be greater than 0. That will happen when ) 2
This is exactly the region in which the manufacturer is not interested in coordination (equation 4) and we know from equation 9 &10 that the pull discount only reduces the breakdown region but cannot eliminate it completely. This analysis helps us to conclude that revenue sharing mechanism helps to coordinate the channel more effectively than pull discount mechanism.
The retailers profit must be greater than the profit he obtains in the solitaire scenario:
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From the above analysis we can conclude that the revenue sharing mechanisms is able to coordinate the channel and provide win-win solution as long as the values of parameters are chosen in accordance with the above analysis. And more importantly this mechanism can prevent the channel breakdown completely unlike the pull discount mechanism which would reduce breakdown region only when the condition on the transaction cost is satisfied. The revenue sharing mechanism is superior to the pull discount mechanism.
For our numerical example the wholesale price can be obtained from equation 15 
Profit sharing mechanism
In the profit sharing mechanism the transactions between the supplier and buyer are governed by the supplier receiving a share of the buyer's profits. (Jeuland and Shugan, 1983 ) have used profit sharing as a mechanism to achieve channel coordination. The profit sharing mechanism can be identified by two parameters, namely, wholesale price W 4 and a percentage of the buyers profit δ (0 < δ < 1), that goes to the supplier.
With the profit sharing mechanisms the retailers profit when he sells only to the highs is ) )( 1 (
The wholesale price should be set such that the retailer is indifferent between the above two options. That will happen when the manufacturer selects the wholesale price such that retailer's profit in equations 25 and equation 26 are equal:
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The wholesale price is independent on the profit sharing percentage and interestingly it is same as the wholesale price that the manufacturer should charge for channel coordination (Equation 1). The manufacturer would be interested in supplying the product at a wholesale price equal to that of the integrated channel as he will be receiving a share of retailer's profit in addition to the wholesale price.
The profit for the manufacturer with the profit sharing mechanism can be obtained as
and the retailers profit is
It is interesting to note that the manufacturer and the retailer makes the same profits with both the revenue sharing and the profit sharing mechanisms as long as the conditions for the wholesale prices as obtained in equation 15 and equation 28 are satisfied. Proof: The manufacturers profit must be greater than the profit he obtains in the solitaire scenario:
This gives a lower bound for δ, as
It is essential for the value of δ to be greater than 0, for which the value in equation 34 is made to be greater than 0. That will happen when ) 2
This is exactly the region in which the manufacturer is not interested in coordination (equation 4) and we know from equation 9 &10 that the pull discount only reduces the breakdown region but cannot eliminate it completely. This analysis helps us to conclude that the profit sharing mechanism helps to coordinate the channel more effectively than pull discount mechanism.
From equations 22 and 34 it can be observed that the lower bounds for the revenue sharing and the profits sharing are obtained to be the same. From equations 24 and 37 the same can be said about the upper bounds. From our analysis it is clear that the range of parameters for both the mechanisms is the same. In addition the profit for the manufacturer and the retailer is the same with its parameters and since the range for parameter values is the same? The above analysis helps us to conclude that both the mechanisms are equivalent and has the potential to coordinate and provide win-win. The concept of channel breakdown as observed by the Hess (1995, 1991) can be avoided by resorting to the either one of the above mechanism. Both the revenue sharing and the profit sharing mechanisms coordinate the channel and at the same time distribute the profits arbitrarily depending on the chosen parameter values.
For our numerical example the profit sharing will yield the same results as the revenue sharing mechanism. The next section analyses the performance of the targeted push-pull discount and the targeted pull discount in combination with the revenue sharing and profit sharing mechanism. Hess (1995, 1991) argue that when the discount is provided such that only the lows can avail it, the probability of channel coordination increases. They call this mechanism as the targeted pull.
Targeted Pull discount
With the help of their analysis they conclude that targeting the pull discount to the price-conscious consumers and making it less accessible to the price-insensitive consumers increases the probability of improved channel price. Their conclusion is based on the intuition that the targeted pull reduces the difference in willingness-topay between the two segments, and as a result the retailer faces a more elastic _____________________________________________________________________ Coordination with Supply Chain Contracts in the Presence of two different consumer segments demand. The more elastic demand makes price reductions more profitable for the retailer, so he is more willing to cooperate and sell to the lows.
They argue that without targeted pull the difference in willingness-to-pay is . Since the lows transaction costs are normalized to zero, their willingness-to-pay is increased by the full amount of the pull discount to
The highs, on the other hand, incur a transaction cost, so their willingness-to-pay is increased to . As a result of the targeted pull the difference in willingness-to-pay is reduced to , and the demand is more elastic. The higher the transaction cost differential, T, the lower is the willingness-to-pay differential, and as a result, the lower is the probability of breakdown in channel price coordination.
Under a well-designed pull, however, price coordination can result not only in higher total channel profits but also in improved consumer surplus. Under coordination, the lows get zero consumer surpluses, but the highs obtain a positive surplus of compared to zero surplus obtained if the channel breaks down. Total welfare, the sum of profits and consumer surplus, equals
In addition to providing a discount directly to the consumer the manufacturer can also provides a wholesale price discount to the retailers and they call this push-pull discount. Hess (1995, 1991) prove with their analysis that targeted pushpull discount mechanism is more effective for providing win-win. The next subsection combines the push discount where in a discount is provided in the wholesale price with the pull mechanism.
"Targeted Push-Pull" Mechanism
In this model push refers to a long-run reduction in wholesale price designed to complement the pull and to induce the retailer permanently to sell to the low willingness-to-pay consumers. They conclude that the manufacturer can increase the probability of channel price coordination by supporting pull with push.
With small transaction costs, the profit-maximizing manufacturer will pick a pull discount to the High's transaction costs.
Given this discount, the highest retail price that induces all customers to buy the product is
To find the equilibrium wholesale price, note that the retail profit equals when the retailer acts cooperatively. The retail price that maximizes the retailer's profit when he threatens to sell only to the Highs is , and the resulting profit equals
To induce retail sales to the lows, the manufacturer offers the discount given in the equation 38 and adjusts the wholesale price until the retailer _____________________________________________________________________ Coordination with Supply Chain Contracts in the Presence of two different consumer segments is just indifferent between selling to all customers and selling only to the Highs. Setting the two retail profit expressions equal and solving for the wholesale price gives
If the manufacturer wanted to sell only to the Highs, the wholesale price would be equal to . As a result, pricing by the manufacturer involves a push as well as a pull.
The retailer is offered a price reduction of the amount
where as the consumers are offered a discount of T.
Using equations 38 and 40 and keeping in mind that the retail price is and that the discount is paid only to the Lows, the manufacturer and retailer's profits are
And the channel profit is T P L α + . Hess (1995, 1991) has performed the above analysis on the combined push pull discount and arrived at the bounds for between which the push-pull strategy fails to repair the breakdown in channel price coordination. The bounds are obtained as,
From the equation 43 it is clear that the combined push-pull discount mechanism fails to coordinate the channel when:
For our numerical example it is clear from equation 44 that the combined pull discount fails to coordinate when the value of T is less than $0.33. The next sub section analyses the effectives of the revenue sharing in combination with the targeted pull discount.
Targeted Pull with Revenue sharing
In this sub section we combine revenue sharing with the targeted pull discount in which only the Lows make use of the discount. The retailers profit when he decides to sell only to the highs is:
Where γ is the percentage of the revenues that the retailer shares with the manufacturer, and the retailers profit when he sells to the entire market is:
The wholesale price should be set such that the retailer is indifferent between the above two options. That will happen when we make the equations 45 and 46 as equal.
Equation 48 gives the wholesale price with the revenue sharing in combination with targeted pull mechanism. The wholesale price is dependent on the percentage of the revenues shared and it is a decreasing function of the percentage of revenues shared. The profit for the manufacturer with the revenue sharing mechanism can be obtained as:
And the retailers profit is: 
The value of the γ in equation 54 represents the lower bound. To be able to design a feasible revenue sharing contract it is important for 0 ≥ γ . This condition on γ helps us to obtain an upper bound for T.
The upper bound for T will be obtained as
Comparing equation 44 and equation 56 it is clear that revenue sharing mechanism in combination with the pull discount works when the combined push-pull mechanisms fail to coordinate.
And when the second part of the equation 57 is made positive the following threshold on the transaction cost is obtained: The following condition on T can be obtained from equation 59:
The Lower bound on T is the smaller value of equation 56 and Equation 60. It is very easy to verify that equation 60 will always be greater than 56. The interesting part of the entire analysis is the restriction on the T value for the revenue sharing percentage γ to be positive. Interestingly the possibility of combining the contract mechanisms with the targeted pull discount will help the channel to coordinate when it fails with the targeted pull or targeted push-pull discount mechanism.
For our numerical example the wholesale price can be obtained from equation 48 upper bound for γ can be obtained from equation 58 as 1. The value of T should be the minimum of the equation 56 and 60 and for our numerical example the minimum from those two equations is 0.33. Interestingly, this is also the range where the push pull discount mechanism fails to coordinate the channel.
The next sub section analyses the profit sharing mechanisms in combination with the profit sharing mechanism.
Targeted pull with the profit sharing mechanism
The present analysis tests the applicability of the profit sharing mechanism in combination with the targeted pull discount. Profit sharing mechanisms is combined with the targeted pull in which only the Lows make use of the discount as the discount value is the same as the High's transaction cost.
Retailers profit when he sells only to the Highs is, ) ( ) (
and the retailers profit when he sells to the entire market :
The wholesale price should be set such that the retailer is indifferent between the above two options. That will happen when we make the equation 61 and 62 are made to be equal. From equation 64 it is clear that the wholesale price is independent of the percentage of the profit shared and interestingly the wholesale price with the profit sharing mechanism is same as that with the push-pull discount as in equation 40.
The profit for the manufacturer with the profit sharing mechanism can be obtained as The proof for theorem 4 follows the same lines as that of the revenue sharing mechanism. Equivalence relationship can be obtained for all the parameter values and like the revenue sharing mechanism, combining profit sharing mechanisms with the push discount mechanism coordinates the channel when the push-pull discount mechanism fails to do so.
Conclusions and managerial implications
This paper compares the performance of the revenue sharing and profit sharing with the pull discount as the channel coordination mechanisms. The present study provides the following interesting insights: 1) When all the customers decide to make use of the discount then revenue sharing and profit sharing mechanisms coordinate the channel and eliminate channel breakdown completely. Pull discount mechanism reduces the breakdown region but does not eliminate it completely.
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3) When the manufacturer designs a targeted pull discount, in combination with the revenue and profit sharing mechanisms the channel coordinates when the transaction cost is below a certain threshold. Interestingly this is exactly the region in which Targeted push-pull discount breaks down.
From an implementation point of view the contract mechanisms will not be more difficult than that of the pull discount mechanism, as these contracts have to be dealt with a single retailer as opposed to an entire customer base in pull discount. Implementing pull discount along with the revenue sharing requires a greater effort, and would be worthwhile if the benefits to the channel are greater than the costs associated with implementing such a contract.
